Participants
The first
in a planned series of Pugwash workshops on Terrorism and Weapons
of Mass Destruction was held in Como, Italy from 26-28 September
2002. There were 25 participants from 11 countries, all attending
in their private capacity. The workshop was made possible through
the generous support of the Municipality of Como, and Pugwash is grateful
to the Municipality and the Landau Network Centro Volta for their
efforts in organizing the meeting. The following report is the sole
responsibility of the rapporteur and does not necessarily reflect
the views of other participants or the workshop as a whole.
The opening session focused on technical aspects of “terrorism
with weapons of mass destruction,” primarily nuclear. Participants
reviewed the wide range of destructive effects of nuclear weapons,
including death, injury and the physical destruction of infrastructure
through blast and heat, as well as widespread contamination by radioactive
fallout (including long-term genetic effects). A nuclear device like
the type used in Hiroshima (13 kilotons), detonated in a big city,
could kill up to a hundred thousand unprotected civilians and devastate
an area of several square kilometers, with tremendous longer-term
physical, economic, social and political consequences. Even the detonation
of a one-kiloton nuclear device in a densely populated area is likely
to create an overwhelming challenge for catastrophe-management response
services.
Concerning the design of nuclear weapons, much scientific information
is publicly available. The most significant technical barrier to constructing
such devices is the acquisition of fissile material, either highly-enriched
uranium (>20% U-235) or plutonium-239. It is generally agreed in
the scientific community that fabricating a gun-type HEU-device is
difficult but feasible, whereas the implosion-type plutonium device
is far more technically demanding. The HEU device could be constructed
in several weeks or months by groups having access to sufficient quantities
of HEU (on the order of 100 kilos), though without being able to test
the device, its precise yield would remain unknown. [See the Pugwash
Issue Brief, “Nuclear Terrorism: The Danger of Highly
Enriched Uranium (HEU)” by Jeffrey Boutwell, Francesco Calogero
and Jack Harris (available at www.pugwash.org)].
Despite progress by the US and Russia to secure and eliminate much
excess HEU in Russia, there remains far too much ‘loose’
fissile material. Given sufficient resources and political will, excess
HEU could be eliminated far more quickly than the current 20-year
projection. One participant warned that politicians will grasp the
scale of the problem only when it is too late, when “a nuclear
explosion is triggered by a terrorist organization.” Scientists
have a responsibility to draw the attention of all governments, not
just the US and Russian, to the problem, and to propose ways of overcoming
political and commercial obstacles to the speedy implementation of
eliminating HEU all over the world. The explosion by terrorists of
an HEU-device is a threat to all peoples and nations.
As noted in the Pugwash Issue Brief: “a team of
terrorists with sufficient knowledge of physics, explosives and machining
could, having gathered information in open and easily available sources,
construct a crude nuclear bomb that would have a high probability
of exploding with a high nuclear yield.” (p.3) Nevertheless,
nuclear aspirants must still (a) develop a design for its nuclear
device or obtain it from a nuclear weapon state; (b) produce the nuclear
material for the device or obtain it from external sources; (c) shape
the nuclear and non-nuclear parts into a nuclear device; and (d) verify
the reliability of all of these elements.
The requirements for the performance and delivery of a military weapon
versus a terrorist device are, of course, quite different. A terrorist
device will entail less technical sophistication in terms of yield,
safety and reliability. For terrorists, any explosion within the lower
kiloton range would represent an unprecedented achievement. Even a
plutonium device that failed to achieve a sustained, critical reaction
would represent a radiological weapon with severe consequences. Terrorists
also have the option of seeking to steal or buy a “tactical nuclear
weapon” from the large stockpiles of TNW remaining in Russia.
Many older TNWs are not secured with modern electronic permissive
action links (PALs), thus making it easier for nuclear terrorists
to detonate such a warhead should they obtain one (see Report on the
Pugwash Workshop on Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Sigtuna, Sweden, May
2002, in the Pugwash Newsletter, Vol. 39 (1), June 2002).
There exist worldwide many sources of weapons-grade nuclear material.
There are in military stockpiles some 1300-2100 metric tons of HEU
and 200-270 metric tons of separated plutonium, with an additional
200 metric tons in civilian stockpiles. More than 20 metric tons of
HEU are located at research reactors in 39 countries, and HEU also
serves as fuel for reactors of nuclear-propelled submarines.
The risk of such material being smuggled, stolen or purchased illegally
most definitely exists, even if it is difficult to quantify. Some
cases of illicit activity have been thwarted, most involving material
that originated from nuclear facilities in Russia or the former Soviet
Union. Given the difficulties of ensuring the security of fissile
materials in storage, or controlling borders and interdicting attempts
at smuggling, the only viable option is to eliminate this material
altogether.
The second session was devoted to the prevention of terrorism
with WMD, especially the control of critical material in the former
Soviet Union and elsewhere. An analysis of the US-Russian “Cooperative
Threat Reduction” (CTR) program showed that arms control, not
security issues, are driving the reductions. Ten years of dismantlement
has yielded impressive results: 6,000 nuclear warheads, 900 launchers
and 800 silos have been eliminated thus far, but the legacy of the
Cold War is still huge: too many warheads, missiles and silos remain
active. After September 11, expenditures for fissile material security
were doubled by the Bush Administration to $320 million for 2002.
Nevertheless, too many security gaps remain: chemical weapons stockpiles
are still vulnerable to air attacks, border control is not yet implemented,
and the oversight of weapons scientists will be essential for the
next 10 years. Continuing problems are lack of funds for high-priority
projects, extremely thin support from politicians, poorly coordinated
strategies and an intransigent bureaucracy.
The IAEA is preparing a concrete action plan to improve security against
terrorism, comprising “physical protection of nuclear material
and facilities, detection of malicious activities involving nuclear
and radioactive materials, the security of radioactive resources,
the assessment of safety and security related vulnerabilities at nuclear
facilities and the enhancement of program coordination and information
management, etc.” The G-8 Global Partnership Program “10+10
over 10 years” is an important step to invest more for threat
reduction, but there are doubts that the G-8 program will be well
coordinated and fully funded. It was suggested that Pugwash could
strengthen such efforts by establishing a road map of priorities.
Certainly the Europeans should do more to support the nuclear cities
initiative and the ISTC and TACIS programs. There are also continuing
issues of Russian transparency regarding CTR.
The third session dealt with military means to prevent terrorism
with WMD, and began with a discussion of Bush administration calls
for launching a preventive war against Saddam Hussein´s Iraq.
For the US government, Saddam Hussein represents a clear and imminent
danger; Iraq has substantial biological and chemical weapon capabilities
and missiles and, left unfettered, the nuclear option for Iraq would
only be a question of time. Regime change is therefore the only option.
For many participants, attacking Iraq cannot be justified by Article
51 of the UN Charter [editor’s note: this was prior to
adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002],
and that a more realistic assessment of Saddam’s WMD capabilities
is needed. There is much opinion that the Iraqi forces are now weaker
than they were ten years ago and that Saddam Hussein might deploy
and possibly use biological and chemical weapons only if driven to
a hopeless situation.
Participants discussed the pros and cons, and possible scenarios and
outcomes, of a military intervention. Most participants did not feel
that a war against Iraq should be seen in the context of the war on
terrorism, but rather by the beliefs of a small group of US officials
that Saddam Hussein must be dealt with ‘once and for all ’.
To achieve this, a full scale invasion and costly urban warfare will
likely be needed. And, while the Bush administration may hope for
a post-Saddam “democratic Iraq”, it is unclear how this
is to be accomplished. There are concerns over political unrest and
violence in Jordan and throughout the Islamic world, not to mention
between Palestinians and Israelis. Finally, even though a regime change
in Iraq is likely to be welcomed by most of the international community,
hostility and terrorism toward the West is likely to increase significantly.
On the other hand, the US military might just win such a war in fairly
short order, given the tactical operational capabilities of US forces
and the degraded state of Iraqi weapons and troops. Yet the important
question remains: why Iraq and why now? More than a few think that
a war mentality since September 11, 2001 is being used by some hardliners
as a pretext to achieve other foreign policy goals, such as US influence
and control of oil supplies in the Middle East.
Regarding WMD, the irony is that Saddam would likely be more prone
to use such weapons when attacked. Chemical weapons, especially, could
be used as weapons of mass disruption to complicate and raise the
costs of an invasion. The same holds true for setting the oil fields
on fire and putting large numbers of Iraqi civilians at risk in defending
the country. It remains unclear how the Iraqi people and military
forces will react to an attack, what the ramifications will be for
civil war in Iraq involving the Kurds in the north and the Shiites
in the South, and how difficult any post-war occupation might be.
For many, what is more important than regime change in Iraq are good
faith efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the
wider Middle East confrontation; resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict would undercut much of Saddam’s appeal and that of terrorist
groups like al-Qaeda.
Regarding the possible return of UN weapons inspectors [editor’s
note: UN inspectors returned to Iraq on November 18, 2002], there
were concerns that Iraqi compliance might not be enough to dissuade
the Bush administration from military action. The proposed coercive
inspections also create new questions: Can Hussein differentiate between
forces supporting the inspections and an occupation force? And who
ultimately decides on the use of force: Chief Weapons Inspector Hans
Blix, the UN Security Council or the US government?
For some, the Iraq issue must be seen in the light of the new “National
Security Strategy” of the US, published in September 2002, which
states that the US would not hesitate to act alone and “pre-emptively”
to thwart dangers from rogue/hostile countries or terrorist groups
armed with, or seeking, nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. The
strategy also calls for the Pentagon to be able to defeat two aggressors
at the same time, “while preserving the option for one massive
counteroffensive to occupy an aggressor´s capital and replace
its regime”. (Donald Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,”
in Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002, pp. 20-46, p. 24). While
“regime change” is defined as a new mission for the military,
the question remains as to who decides which country is ripe for a
forceful regime change and what kind of a new world order would be
created? In light of this, one participant argued that “the biggest
trouble spot today is the United States.”
Concern was also expressed over the proclivity for unilateralism in
US foreign policy. These objections were expressed mainly in regards
to the credibility and sustainability of international law as expressed
by the UN charter, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other arms
control regimes, such as the ABM Treaty, the CTBT and the Biological
Weapons Convention. The 13 practical steps to implement Article VI
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, unanimously adopted in the Final
Declaration at the 2000 Review Conference, are still awaiting implementation.
One participant especially pointed to the fact that the US is not
in compliance with the BWC and the CWC and that additionally, the
USA is not funding the CTBT verification efforts. Pugwash should bring
such facts to the attention of politicians, the media, and the public.
Generally, multilateral institutions and agreements are being marginalized
by the Bush administration, and could set dangerous precedents for
other countries. This could especially be true in the area of nuclear
weapons testing. Accordingly, Pugwash should base its thinking and
action on seeking to strengthen international norms and regimes. The
absence of superpower rivalry provides unique opportunities to create
new international frameworks and norms of behavior, and Pugwash should
continue to bring its expertise to bear in these areas.
