Participants
This workshop
on strategic stability and nuclear threats, held 8-10 July 2002 in
Moscow, covered subjects far different from those during the Cold
War. A strong theme was the potential or present instability in East
Asia and particularly South Asia and the Middle East. The US-Russian
relationship was discussed in the immediate aftermath of the Moscow
Summit in May, where the successor to the SALT-START strategic nuclear
weapons treaties was signed, and the termination in June of the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty upon the US withdrawal. The fact that the workshop
covered but did not dwell on these US-Russian matters (or even the
changing political relationship between the two) is evidence that
concerns about strategic stability and nuclear weapons are largely
focused elsewhere. Thus, the seventeen participants from outside Russia,
who were joined by a large and knowledgeable Russian contingent, covered
a broad range of subjects. They also enjoyed a never-ending variety
of events scheduled by the energetic Alexander Nikitin and hosted
by the Russian Pugwash Group, and benefited from informative sessions
at the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Atomic Energy and
the Kurchatov Institute.
US-Russian Strategic
Relations
Notwithstanding the signing
of the Declaration on New Strategic Relations at the May summit between
Presidents Bush and Putin, the nature of this evolving relationship
is unclear even as Russia moves politically toward the West and focuses
on its economic development. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
itself is a flawed document, but will keep Russia in rough parity
with the US on deployed strategic nuclear weapons through 2012, particularly
since the ban on MIRV’d ICBMs in START II will never enter into
force. Hope was expressed at the workshop that some of the ambiguities
in the new treaty, including how to count the deployed weapons covered
by the Treaty and the verification regime, might be resolved over
the new term and that ratification would be prompt. Neither has happened
as the year 2002 draws to a close. Left unresolved by a ceiling of
1700-2200 deployed warheads are central questions starting with the
continuing role of nuclear weapons, the dismantlement of the excess
warheads and conversion of the fissile materials. Little optimism
was voiced that these carryover issues from the Cold War buildups
would be addressed anytime soon.
The demise of the ABM Treaty was noted more by sadness than as raising
Russian security concerns. Participants seemed to take their cue from
President Putin’s conclusion that in the near-term (10 to 15
years), US ballistic missile defense programs would not adversely
effect Russia’s deterrent capability. The general sense was that
the primary impact of the US BMD programs would be elsewhere, particularly
East Asia.
The US-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction program, now in its tenth
year, has been successful, but needs to be accelerated and expanded.
Participants were fortunate to hear a pioneering proposal to apply
the learning and experience in Russia to the physical protection of
nuclear weapons and facilities in other countries, particularly India
and Pakistan, in this era of heightened concern with terrorism and
nuclear proliferation. But neither India nor Pakistan is a party to
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nor is either a member of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group. The legal and policy issues are new and acute,
and even the readiness of India or Pakistan to accept outside suggestions
or assistance is uncertain. Further, no single approach is likely
to work and cooperation may occur first on non-nuclear- weapon materials.
Nevertheless, this new initiative could be of real importance and
non-governmental groups, including Pugwash, could have important roles.
Unfortunately, no one from India or Pakistan was present to respond
in Moscow.
Nuclear proliferation has already occurred in South Asia and raises
acute and continuing challenges. The two other geographic regions
discussed were East Asia and the Middle East. The former appeared
to many to be less pressing, assuming China’s modernization remains
unprovocative, disputes over Taiwan do not flair up dangerously, and
North Korea remains contained. Concerns were expressed about Pyongyang’s
intent and the future of the Agreed Framework, but in July 2002 when
the workshop was held the Korean peninsula was still quiet [editor’s
note: this situation markedly deteriorated in November 2002 when North
Korea announced it was resuming pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability.]
The Middle East, particularly including Iraq and Iran, were the center
of intense discussions. No one differed with the conclusion stated
by several that if Iraq crossed the nuclear-weapon threshold, Iran
would as well. Iran is clearly on a path that brings it closer to
nuclear-weapon capability, but the public evidence of its policy is
ambiguous. While several participants stressed the US desire that
Russia curtail or end its nuclear relationship with Iran, one suggested
that the US should no longer oppose Russian policy if Russia committed
to the take back the spent fuel from any reactors it builds in Iran.
Other participants noted the ambiguity in past and present Iranian
acts, but believe Russian assistance, particularly the construction
of a single reactor at Bushehr, is appropriate. Those supporting the
differing US and Russian policies all seemed to agree that Iran’s
future decisions would be guided, in part, by developments in Iraq.
No one suggested that Iran would necessarily remain a non-nuclear
weapon state even if Iraq’s programs were credibly stopped.
The discussion of Iraq’s nuclear ambitions raised the most diverse
views. One participant bluntly stated his understanding of US policy
— Iraq was on course to develop nuclear weapons, sanctions were
ineffective, and military action therefore necessary. (At the same
time, he indicated a military response was not considered appropriate
for dealing with either Iran or North Korea.) Regime change might
come from an internal coup, but the US view was that a pre-emptive
strike was necessary in the alternative. He described the differing
motivations within the Bush administration, and thought they would
never be resolved. He noted the disagreement among experts on the
consequences of military action, particularly a US occupation of Iraq.
The Russian and Chinese positions were presented as dependent on the
UN Security Council actions and giving Iraq a final chance. One participant
thought a coup within Iraq unlikely and raised questions about the
impact of war on the Iraqi civil population, the general geographic
area, and public opinion in Europe. Israel’s three-decade nuclear
capability, even if devoted to its defense, was recognized as a huge
unsettling factor particularly in the absence of peace negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinians. Returning to the general theme
of the workshop, one participant suggested that the search for stability
in the Middle East may in fact lead to instability.
Other themes expressed at the workshop on related matters included:
- the NPT regime seemed
relatively stable for most states, notwithstanding the differing
applicable standards to certain parties and among the three non-parties,
Israel, India and Pakistan, and the suspect performance of several
parties;
- Russian nuclear weapons
had no role in areas of regional conflict and should be removed;
and
- the building a new
US-Russian relationship will take a great deal of time and must
be based on a real understanding of each other’s security needs
and concerns.
In brief, the workshop
explored a number of difficult, if not intractable, problems in a
fast-changing world where anti-terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation
are priorities. It was clear from the discussions that while agreement
on ends may be achieved, the means to achieve them are likely to remain
divisive.
