Introduction "You can do anything with bayonets except sit on them." - Old saying from the Napoleonic Wars "The past is another country, they do things differently there." -L P Hartley
August 2005 marks the 60th anniversary of the use of nuclear weapons by the US in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The dawn of the nuclear age provided the link between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. The nuclear weapon with its apocalyptic connotations became part of the strategic calculus of the superpowers of the period, and the dialectical tension was maintained by creating weapons of greater lethality even while ensuring their non-use through the framework of deterrence. The dominant discourse in nuclear theology averred that deterrence as a concept is an integral part of the permanent canon, or lore, and the eternal practice of statecraft and strategy - and that as such, it is enduring.
Besides seeking to maintain stable nuclear deterrence between themselves, the great powers also sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other states. The second objective was codified in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970. Under the treaty, the emphasis was on preventing horizontal proliferation to new states without credible commitments from the nuclear weapon states to check vertical proliferation among themselves. In the early years, the principal objective of the NPT was to ensure that the defeated Axis powers of World War II (Germany, Japan and Italy) did not acquire nuclear weapons and this was achieved within the first decade. By gaining German and Japanese adherence to the NPT, the Yalta system, devised in 1945, was extended to the nuclear arena. However, both France and China, whose nuclear weapons were considered legitimate under the NPT, chose not to join the treaty till 1992 when the Cold War had ended and, progressively, nuclear non-proliferation was deified at the altar of global strategic stability even as the nuclear weapon entropy of the world was on the rise. Paradoxically, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995 dividing the world into permanent categories of five nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the others as non NWS - barring a few states that chose to stay outside the treaty. With it, the opportunity provided by the end of the Cold War to fundamentally reconsider the role and relevance of nuclear weapons, and find ways to abolish them, was lost. India was one of the three states (the others being Pakistan and Israel) that remained outside the frozen framework of the NPT in 1995. The unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT did not end the variety of problems that the global nuclear order faced. A series of developments followed the NPT extension in 1995 that sharpened global nuclear contradictions and marked the arrival of the second nuclear age. These include, inter alia, the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, the inability of the NPT system to check leakages from the nuclear weapon states and other advanced countries, the ineffectiveness of the system to prevent states from cheating on the obligations of the NPT, the danger of terrorist groups and non-state actors acquiring nuclear weapons - the consequences of which were dramatised by the events of 9/11 - and the emergence of clandestine networks of nuclear commerce abetted by state complicity that seemed to defy the logic of the NPT with impunity. Many of these fears have come true with the revelations of the AQ Khan iceberg but what is more relevant is that prevailing global norms and regulations on nuclear non-proliferation, with the NPT at its core, have proved to be structurally inadequate in addressing the emerging and complex nuclear challenges of the post Cold War, post-9/11 global systemic.
It is in this context that many of the basic provisions of the NPT are now being scrutinised, and the original political bargains that went into the making of the treaty in the second half of the 1960s appear to be unravelling. For some, like the Bush Administration, the principal emphasis has been on tightening the compliance of the obligations of non-nuclear weapons states not to acquire nuclear weapons under Article III. There have also been calls to further restrict the rules under which peaceful nuclear commerce can take place. These are aimed at preventing states from developing nuclear weapons in the name of peaceful nuclear programmes.
Besides reinforcing the mechanisms for compliance with Article III and limiting nuclear commercial flows as envisaged under Article IV, the proponents of non-proliferation have also demanded a curtailment of the right to withdraw from the treaty. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration has also been seeking to create structures outside the treaty to ensure that non-nuclear states do not acquire nuclear weapons. For the non-nuclear states, the focus has been on preserving their right to acquire peaceful nuclear technologies promised to them under Article IV. They also point to the importance of nuclear weapon states giving credible negative security assurances, as well as commitments not to use nuclear weapons. Equally important for the non-nuclear states is Article VI of the treaty that calls for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. Articles IV and VI are widely seen as the quid pro quo for non-nuclear states to forego their right to acquire nuclear weapons. That interpretation, however, is being challenged by many of the nuclear weapon powers today. These divisive debates have torn apart the members of the NPT community and are likely to be reflected in the ongoing review conference.
While India had declared itself as a nuclear weapon state in May 1998, a move driven by its core security interests, it remains committed to the spirit of nuclear non-proliferation. India's track record is testimony to its abiding commitment to non-proliferation. Since 1988 India has also repeatedly emphasised that it stands in full compliance with the obligations of a nuclear weapon state under the NPT. The commitments to complete the abolition of nuclear weapons in a non-discriminatory framework and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are abiding features of the Indian nuclear posture. This was reiterated most recently by the Indian Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, at the 50th anniversary of the setting up of the Indian Department of Atomic Energy when he noted: "India is a responsible nuclear power. We are fully conscious of the immense responsibilities that come with the possession of advanced technologies, both civilian and strategic. While we are determined to utilise our indigenous resources and capabilities to fulfil our national interests, we are doing so in a manner that is not contrary to the larger goals of nuclear non-proliferation." Within this framework, India has been engaging with the major nuclear powers to strengthen the objective of nuclear non-proliferation in an equitable manner, wherein individual interests will be addressed even while global strategic stability is enhanced in a consensual manner. Thus, what is germane is the need to evolve a new nuclear order that is cognisant of the contours of the new challenges and contradictions of the 21st century, and can explore appropriate options in an objective and constructive manner. This was the spirit behind the convening of the conference jointly organized by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and Pugwash India in New Delhi, on March 28-29, 2005 and the different sessions addressed specific issues in the nuclear domain. The papers included in this volume, and the summary of the deliberations represent the views of individual experts and the Track II constituency who took part in the conference, and are in no way reflective of any institutional or government position.
The post-9/11 world order has now morphed into the post-Iraq turbulence, with the core anxieties being WMD, NPT transgressions, non-state actors, terrorism, and deviant regimes. The divergent perceptions about Iraq, Iran, North Korea and the Khan network are indicative of this terrain. At one end of the spectrum, the major powers, as exemplified by the US, are embarking upon acquiring new nuclear weapons - the so-called bunker busters - and this will have a negative impact on the dilution of the role of the nuclear weapon in the security matrix of states. The legitimate energy requirements of major global economies are likely to see a fillip in civilian nuclear power generation; and the need for more effective multilateral regulation is a shared concern.
India has modest but valuable experience and expertise in a range of nuclear related issues and has demonstrated its rectitude and sense of responsibility in husbanding this capability. The emerging nuclear challenges call for a more innovative and empathetic global consensus where shared values and objectives translate into appropriate structures and regulatory norms. India is willing to accept both the responsibility and obligations that are so entailed, and hopefully this quiet determination will be noted in the prevailing global nuclear review that is grappling with the elusive contours of the new nuclear age and the attendant interpretation and implementation of deterrence.
For more information, contact C. Uday Bhaskar at IDSA, at cudayb@gmail.com
