Earlier this year a proposal was put forward by representatives
of 32 scientific journals for new guidelines on publication . These
guidelines were deemed necessary because of a heightened threat perception
and the potential that some publications might be aiding biological
warfare development. This paper uses the idea of ‘adoption of threat
models’ for its context to present a reaction to that statement. By
deconstructing the threat model contradictions between the embedded
assumptions of the model and the group behaviour associated with
scientists are noticed. It concludes that whilst the statement is
a good beginning those contradictions mean it is an inadequate final
product. The discussion about adoption of models has important implications
for the upcoming discussions about codes of conduct.
After a meeting on 9th January 2003 members of the Journal Editors
and Authors Group, comprising of 32 leading journal editors including
Nature, Nature Medicine and Critical Reviews in Microbiology,
agreed a statement on guidelines for publication. [1] The statement, reprinted in full in Nature on February
20th 2003, contained the following points
We recognize that the prospect of bioterrorism has raised legitimate
concerns about the potential abuse of published information… We
are committed to dealing responsibly and effectively with safety
and security issues that may be raised by papers submitted for publication,
and to increasing our capacity to identify such issues as they arise…[O]n
occasions an editor may conclude that the potential harm of publication
outweighs the potential societal benefits… the paper should be modified,
or not be published… [2]
By issuing this statement, these journal editors
were perceiving the threat from biological warfare (BW) as sufficiently
high to warrant a system of self-censorship on the public dissemination
of certain aspects of their community’s research.
At the heart of their statement is the issue
of ‘dual use’ for it is this quality of tangible and intangible elements
of technology to have current and potential applicability to illegitimate
as well as legitimate purposes which is being recognised by the journal
editors. But why is this statement being made now? Has the contribution
made by dual-use technologies to BW development suddenly increased,
thereby increasing the BW threat?
This paper will present one context in which
a reaction to that statement can be made. The reaction is based on
the belief that the journal editors have uncritically accepted as
true a model of BW threat which has embedded within it two assumptions:
that advances in biology equal enhancements to BW agents and that
increased availability of dual use technologies is increasing the
likelihood of their use. These assumptions are widely accepted in
political fields and are therefore seen as leading to an implicit
and reasonable assessment of threat. However, if uncritical acceptance
of this model and its assumptions has taken place by these members
of the scientific community, then an identity crisis could be provoked
– for the group identity of scientists sees them as rational and questioning
individuals who, before accepting new knowledge, will examine and
test evidence.
Background to the journal editors statement
Traditionally viewed, the scientific community is shown to wrestle
with ideas of secrecy: the Mertonian norms of science - communism,
universalism, disinterestedness, and organised scepticism (CUDOS)
- are invoked by those who wish to show an inimical and unnatural
relationship between science and secrecy.
[3] The norms of 'communism' and 'organised scepticism' in particular
are most at odds with the idea of censorship. The first necessitates
full disclosure of scientific findings and methods which in turn permits
the second norm, that all claims be subjected to trials of replication
and verification, without insult to the claimant, thereby making it
impossible for false or wrongly founded theories to persist.
In reality, this model of science as pursuit of ‘public knowledge'
is primitive employing unrealistic notions and descriptions of the
contemporary practice of science. Science as practised today has numerous
examples of conscious and unconscious acts of censorship, ranging
from tacit knowledge, to research conducted under proprietary rules,
to defence-related pursuits of scientific and engineering knowledge
under conditions of restricted access. The idea of censoring dissemination
of scientific research then is not new and should not provoke controversy.
However in biology, controversy has emerged. The publication
of several pieces of “contentious research” [4] during 2001-2002, such as a paper on the synthesis
of polio virus cDNA without natural template; another on the design
of variola virus immune evasion; and a third on how to overcome genetic
resistance to mousepox [5]
, led to concerns being raised about the risks of unrestricted
publication of certain research in an atmosphere of heightened perception
of threat from biological weapons.
The media, for example, interpreted the publication of one of
those papers (the Cello et al paper on the synthesis of polio virus
cDNA without natural template) as proving that any virus could be
synthesised from chemical reagents purchased on the open market. [6] Highly sensitive to the issue of BW after the anthrax letters
campaign, media reports engendered mass nervousness about the possible
contribution advancing biology was giving to those who wished to use
biological weapons against them. The media was not the only group
to react to the Cello et al paper. Political reaction reached the
extent of Representative Dave Weldon of Florida introducing House
Resolution 514 which criticised the publication of it on the basis
that the paper “publish[ed] a blueprint that could conceivably enable
terrorists to inexpensively create human pathogens for release on
the people of the United States.” [7] The resolution included propositions that
(3) The scientific community should develop ethical
standards and exercise restraint to ensure that information that
may be used by terrorists is not made widely available; and
(4) The executive branch should examine all policies,
including national security directives, relevant to the classification
or publication of federally funded research to ensure that, although
the free exchange of information is encouraged, information that
could be useful in the development of chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons is not made accessible to terrorists or countries of proliferation
concern.
Despite many in the scientific community “conclud[ing] that
the Cello et al experiment was neither a novel discovery nor a potential
threat” [8] the debate
about unrestricted publication of potentially relevant BW information
was taken up in a series of workshops which examined possible guidelines
for publication of such material. [9] These workshops were not only
responding to the observed mass nervousness but can also be thought
of as an attempt to draw the wider biological community into becoming
members of a ‘community of those with shared fate’ – the public with
their increased nervousness following the anthrax letters campaign,
government officials and other national members of the arms control
and disarmament community who had been raising the issue of the threat
from biological weapons, and the wider international community that
had spent 10 years negotiating what came to be a failed compliance-verification
regime for the Biological Weapons Convention.
According to the journal editors statement published in Nature,
it was a day after one of these workshops (the January 9th 2003 workshop)
that “a group of journal editors, augmented by scientist authors,
government officials, and others, held a separate meeting designed
to explore possible approaches…What follow[ed they said] reflect[ed]
some outcomes of that preliminary discussion.” [10]
What seems to be apparent from both the reaction
to the publication of one of those pieces of 'contentious research'
by the media and politicians and the action taken by the scientific
community is that their concerns centre around the familiar and challenging
problem of governance of 'dual-use' technologies. In its short-hand
understanding, 'dual-use' refers to tangible resources which can be
converted from military to non-military purposes. [11] This definition is unsatisfactory.
A more comprehensive understanding, realising the full range of opportunities
where duality could be exploited, can be gained by applying a multi-disciplinary
approach toward the definition of ‘technology’. For example, applying
Autio and Laamanen’s view of technology allows consideration not only
of the duality to be found in tangible components of technology but
also of those to be found in
the ability to recognise technical problems, the ability to develop
new concepts and tangible solutions to technical problems, the concepts
and tangibles developed to solve technical problems, and the ability
to exploit the concepts and tangibles in an effective way [12]
These are qualities embodied in people and have the same capacity
to be dual-use as the artefacts they produce. A more satisfactory
definition of 'dual-use technologies' is therefore achieved when it
is understood that tangible and intangible technological components
can be considered dual-use if they have current and/or potential military
and civilian application.
[13] In the case of these pieces of 'contentious research' the
issue is the management of intangible dual use technologies - the
tacit and codified knowledge within the published research. The concern
is that from the publication of a piece of legitimate dual-use research,
a scientist with skills such as the ability to recognise technical
problems and to solve them, and the ability to use these solutions
effectively, could use the publication for illegitimate reasons. [14]
But why is attention now being drawn to the
potential contribution scientific literature could have to BW development?
In order to answer this question it is necessary to look at the current
construction of the model of threat.
Models
Models of the real world are used in a variety
of fields to facilitate the understanding of real-world scenarios
by introducing assumptions of what factors influence the scenario
and their effect. Therefore idealised and oversimplified realities
are constructed within definite boundaries that isolate what happens
inside the model from the chaotic influences of external forces.
Models of groups also offer individual and social identity.
Adopting a model allows a group of individuals to identify, or be
identified with, certain norms of behaviour. For example, one norm
found when modelling scientists is that the pursuit of science should
be for social good. Those scientists and non scientists who adopt
this model are provided with a norm that gives them social identity
and importantly provides them with both a guide to behaviour and a
reason to behave in a certain way. Should a scientist adopt a norm
of behaviour and then act in a manner that goes against it, an identity
crisis occurs. A similar identity crisis would also take place if
mutually exclusive models are adopted: a scientist cannot adopt a
model that permits hostile use of science if he already adheres to
a model that forecloses this path of behaviour.
Models can be novel or ‘pre-packaged’ offering “ready-made solutions
[taken from] other jurisdictions." [15] They are particularly useful in policy making.
According to Braithwaite and Drahos policy makers tend to adopt the
‘pre-packaged’ variety because
A state does not – cannot – search for the best solution to the
problems it would like to do something about. Solutions that are
good enough will do. Hence when someone offers a pre-packaged model
that is good enough, it is often an efficient use of the state’s
time to buy [into] it. [16]
Should a ‘pre-packaged model’ or ‘ready-made
solution’ be adopted in a different policy area from that which it
was created for, then model-users in the new policy area have to inherit
some of the basic assumptions created for its previous use i.e. they
have to identify with some of the assumptions
in order to make the ‘good enough’ solutions work.
Threat model
Models of threat are distinctive because of the complex and
abstract characteristics of the environment. Their abstract tendencies
become apparent when examining how model assumptions are created.
According to Cohen, assumptions are created by a series of “anticipation[s]
on the part of the observer, the decision maker, of impending harm.” [17] These anticipations can be either ‘actual’, i.e. inferred
from definite signals of intent, or ‘potential’ meaning they are inferred
from some state of the environment or capability of an opponent. In
circumstances of creating threat assumptions Cohen believes that
it is [rare] that the decision-maker comes into possession of evidence
of a syllogistic kind sufficiently adequate or reliable to enable
him to draw certain conclusions. In other words, the perception
of threat is invariably based on a deductive step - a leap in the
dark - that necessarily goes beyond the limited information inherent
in the original statement [18]
What Cohen is arguing is that when creating
assumptions of threat, and therefore the models themselves, an anticipation
of the real world, not the real world itself, is being described.
Unlike other models which used observed or known factors, the factors
and effects in threat models are not logical or reasoned, but created
by deductive methods that can be influenced by all kinds of external
factors. Those who wish to adopt the model and be identified with
it are therefore associating themselves with unreasoned methods susceptible
to international, institutional and political biases.
All current commentaries on BW seem to contain
two embedded assumptions which are then interlinked to form a model
of threat. These two assumptions are:
Increased availability of dual use technologies is increasing
the possibility of BW use
Advancing biology is widening the ability of disease
to be put to hostile purposes.
Interlinked, they flow into a model of threat
which perceives an increased likelihood of BW weapons use. The model
as read also reveals an ‘implicit’ course of action to reduce the
level of perceived threat: govern the availability of relevant
dual-use technologies.
This current model of threat is widely accepted in political
fields as a reasonable assessment of the real world situation and
as providing an implicit course of action to follow. [19] So accepted is this model that it is
hard to imagine an alternative, or alternative course of action to
put forward for adoption. However, the embedded assumptions
of the current threat model cause conflict with the model of scientific
inquiry and therefore provokes an identity crisis for a scientist
accepting it uncritically. What follows is a deconstruction of the
current threat model, elaborating on the assumptions and course of
action providing a genealogy of their acceptance.
Assumption 1: Increased availability of dual
use technologies is increasing the possibility of BW use
The most public declaration of this assumption
came in the January 1992 summit session of the United National Security
Council where the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was
considered as a threat to international peace and security. The statement,
made by heads of state and government, went on:
The members of the Council commit themselves to working to prevent
the spread of technology related to the research for or production
of such weapons and to take appropriate action to that end [20]
This statement is significant because it was
the first time since the end of the Cold War that a collective definition
of what was considered a threat was made. The threat as defined was
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with ‘proliferation’
referring to the growth and spread of an object, if that growth is
left unchecked. This understanding then became the basis for an agreed
model of threat with its course of action being that heads of state
and government “commit[ted] themselves to working to prevent the
spread of technology related to the research for or production
of such weapons” (emphasis added).
Since the 1992 United Nations redefinition
of the threat environment, the notion that proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction technology (including biological dual-use technologies)
is the new threat to world peace and stability has been repeatedly
expressed. President Clinton, for example, addressing the United Nations
General Assembly in September 1993 said:
One of our most urgent priorities must be attacking the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, whether they are nuclear, chemical
or biological; and the ballistic missiles that can rain them down
on populations hundreds of miles away. If we do not stem the proliferation
of the world's deadliest weapons, no democracy can feel secure. [21]
Similar concerns were raised by the communiqué issued after
the North Atlantic Council meeting in January 1994. The communiqué
stated "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery means constitutes a threat to international security and
is a matter of concern to NATO. We have decided to expand Nato’s political
and defence efforts against proliferation, taking into account the
work already underway in other international fora and institutions."
[22] As the notion of an increase in threat from biological weapons
became embedded in the consciousness of governments, so did the converse:
that conceivable benefits from their use were increasing.
The assumption that increased availability of dual use technologies
increases the likelihood of BW use can be traced to before the 1992
Summit Statement. For example the year before at the Third Review
Conference for the BWC, the states explicitly referenced this assumption.
In the UK contribution, they said:
There can be no doubt that the proliferation of legitimate civilian
industrial microbiology activities, and the continuing development
of the underlying theory and equipment, has increased the potential
world-wide for developing and producing biological weapons… [23]
Because this view was shared by so many others at that Review
Conference the Final Declaration welcomed statements from States
who “have made to the effect that they have not transferred agents,
toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery, specified in Article
I of the Convention, to any recipient whatsoever and have not furnished
assistance, encouragement or inducement to any State, group of States
or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire
them.” [24] With
this number of states reiterating the same assumption, previous acceptance
of it is implied.
As already mentioned when "confronted with the need to
solve a problem… there is probably a tendency to… search for ready-made
solutions in other jurisdictions" [25] which often entails inheriting assumptions.
In this case, the belief that unchecked spread of certain technologies
increases a threat, as implied at the Third Review Conference as well
as the 1992 UN Summit Statement, is not without precedents.
The basic assumption of the members of the Co-ordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) set up in 1949 for example,
was that danger will increase if some military relevant technologies
fall into the hands of the Soviet bloc countries and China. The action
resulting from that assumption was for the members to restrict the
availability of certain technologies in order to prevent and/or delay
acquisition of military relevant Western technology by those countries. [26]
This assumption, and course of action, was
in turn adopted in another policy context: by those countries who
in 1984, responded to the findings of a special investigatory mission,
sent by the UN Secretary General to Iran, that chemical weapons had
been used in the Iran-Iraq war. Their action established export controls
on certain dual-use technologies to ensure that their industries were
not, either on purpose or inadvertently, assisting other states to
acquire and use chemical weapons. In other words technology distribution
was curtailed. Some of these countries then went on to form the Australia
Group, which continued this process for dual-use chemical technologies,
expanding it in 1990 to include dual-use biological technologies.
By 1992 therefore, when the heads of state
and government made their declaration about working to prevent the
spread of technology underlying weapons of mass destruction, the assumption
had already been accepted and was used by some governments as a policy
tool. This assumption has since been perpetuated by a series of external
events such as the transgression of the norm by the Soviet Union and
Iraq, revelations about the South African programme, the anthrax letter
campaign, and the globalisation of biotechnology, which have all helped
to increase the perception of threat by proliferating dual-use biological
technologies. The assumption continues to be repeated by Governments
at Review Conferences including Switzerland at the Fourth Review Conference
in 1996 when it said
The methods of bio- and gene technology [have become] widespread
and are therefore more and more accessible to less experienced scientists,
which enhances the danger of proliferation of BW technologies.
[emphasis added] [27]
The UK at the same conference
said
The growing use of high
quality chemical engineering in fermentation processes in all geographical
regions of the world also increases the opportunities for misuse
of this technology for the production of pathogens or toxins as
BW… Increasingly worldwide use of
technologies including bioprocessing in the civilian sector has
further increased the opportunities for BW proliferation
[emphasis added] [28]
And at the Fifth Review Conference the USA:
The global availability of massive amounts of genomic information
and capabilities to manipulate that information for both peaceful
and non-peaceful purposes is both encouraging and unsettling. These
technological achievements have implications for enhancing biological
weapons proliferation, but they also provide mechanisms for enhancing
protection and prophylaxis against such weapons, thereby strengthening
the BWC. [29]
Comments such as these made by states parties reflect the collective
acceptance that the perception of threat from BW, and so the conceivable
benefit that could be gained from resorting to it, has increased because
of increased availability of dual-use biological technologies. In
turn, possession of dual-use technologies or dual-use industries seems
to have created a perception that exploitation of them for hostile
use will be actualised.
Assumption 2: Advancing biology is widening
the ability of disease to be put to hostile purposes.
This assumption is based on a concern that advancing biology
could potentially lead to enhanced BW agents. It is an assumption
that has been well studied.
[30] The potential contribution that biology could make to BW
developments was also recognised by the writers of the BWC when in
Article 1 they included the enlightened words of the General Purpose
Criterion. These words are underlined below
[Each states party] undertakes never under in
any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire
or retain:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents or toxins,
whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective
or other peaceful purposes;
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed
to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed
conflict.
By prohibiting purposes not things, the General Purpose Criterion
allows the BWC to be relevant to any advances made in biology. At
the heart of this assumption is the translation made between advancing
biology, particularly biotechnology, the widening ability of disease
to be put to hostile use, and actualisation of weapon use. Like the
previous assumption this translation is also evident in passages from
the science and technology papers submitted to the BWC Review Conferences.
A clear shift from the sanguine attitude displayed
during the First Review Conference towards science and technology
developments can be identified during the Second Review Conference
when in the Final Declaration of that Conference states parties noted:
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions, arising
from relevant scientific and technological developments, inter
alia, in the fields of microbiology, genetic engineering and
biotechnology, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent
with the objectives and provisions of the Convention, reaffirms
that the undertaking given by the States parties in Article I applies
to all such developments.
The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally
applies to all natural or artificially created microbial or other
biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production.
Consequently toxins (both proteinaceous and non-proteinaceous) of
a microbial, animal or vegetable nature and their synthetically
produced analogues are covered. [31]
The intervening Review Conferences did nothing
to reduce the rising tide of apprehension about potential abuse
Our concerns expressed in 1991 remain, that while promising great
benefits to mankind the advances in technology could be used
to produce new substances or modify old ones and lead to a new and
significant toxin, biological or biochemical weapons threat and
we all must remain aware and cognizant of this potential… [emphasis
added]. [32]
Other countries besides
the USA also expressed concern at the conference, including Sweden
Advances in molecular biology
are providing new insights into the molecular pathology of diseases
and have already affected the way drug discovery is undertaken.
The research is focused on molecular targets and is organized around
the mechanisms underlying disease processes. Co-evolution of mammalian
cells and microorganisms has ensured that virulence factors are
extremely well adapted and the study of the interface between cell
biology and microbiology is one driving force in this development.
Gene therapy is another area of research that is important in the
characterization and validation of potential molecular targets.
While these developments have been and are beneficial in the
context of public health, animal health and agriculture, it has
also the potential, if misused, to be a base for development of
new or modified BW agents or toxins…. The growing knowledge about
disease-causing mechanisms and about fine tuned control of processes
in the human body explores new avenues for therapy and prophylaxis
but also increases the risk of misuse.[emphasis added]
[33]
Sweden made similar remarks
at the Fifth Review Conference, but added:
While these developments have been and are mostly beneficial they
can also be misused. Biotechnology could be used to create an
increasingly complex set of pathogens and toxic molecules targeted
at humans, plants or animals… [emphasis added] [34]
Each Final Declaration expanded the scope of scientific fields
over which the Conference held apprehensions. In the last of those
statements made at the Fourth Review Conference in 1996, the Conference
stated apprehension about the potential misuse of "microbiology,
biotechnology, molecular biology, genetic engineering, and any applications
resulting from genome studies". [35]
In the submissions to the Review Conferences quoted above, the
emphasis placed on the advances in biology illustrates the framing
of the dual-use dilemma by the diplomats of participating governments.
They perceived, that as the science base of biology advanced in its
civilian industrial setting, the mass of technology that might be
put to use to create advanced BW agents was increasing. When coupled
with the previous assumption the increasing availability of these
technologies was translated into a perceived threat that it was becoming
easier for a determined country to acquire the necessary technology
to develop advanced biological weapons. Each successive advance in
the technology - whether in terms of knowledge base of life processes,
technology development, or increased availability - caused the states
parties greater concern about the threat posed from biological weapons.
The linkage in assumptions made by states parties
between perceived threat, advances in biotechnology, and increased
availability of relevant technologies, meant model-users were able
to predict that: a determined BW proliferator will use advanced
biology in order to create enhanced BW agents and use dual use technologies
achieve this end.
Action 1: Govern the availability of relevant
dual-use technologies
The assumptions described above have similarities with other
control mechanisms suggesting a 'pre-packaged solution'. Likewise
this action is not without its own precedents. Supply-side
control mechanism, such as export controls, are used to control the
flow of technology in order to prevent or impede the acquisition of
technology for illegitimate reasons. The core belief of such
an action is to "manipulate global access to... technology" [36] and maintain stability. For example, when CoCom members assumed
that ‘danger will increase if some technology was to fall into the
hands of the Soviet bloc countries and China’ the implicit action
they undertook was to curtail access to the 'dangerous' technology
by “circulating lists of embargoed goods, including the international
lists which name goods that have dual civilian and military application.”
Before an embargoed technology could be exported to a Soviet bloc
country or China the consent of all CoCom members was required. [37]
The Wassanaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional
Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies which followed CoCom was
"established in order to contribute to regional and international
security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater
responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods
and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations."
[emphasis added] [38] Like CoCom, the Wassanaar
Arrangement circulated lists of sensitive technologies but unlike
CoCom, transfers of these technologies did not require group approval.
Denial of transfer by one member did not necessitate the denial by
all members of the same transfer and vigilance was not limited to
the Former Soviet Union and China. Similarly members of the Australia
Group have also adopted the belief that preventing acquisition of
technology will prevent destabilising accumulations of chemical and
biological warfare materials. Through the use of 'common control lists'
and harmonisation of national export control systems development of
chemical and biological weapons are thought to be impeded.
It follows, that to control technology flows,
countries have to be identified which are seen as posing a threat
to the status quo if they were to be in possession of those technologies.
Whilst this implies that assessments of intention are conducted, it
also means that assessments of threat are used - for if there was
no threat then all intentions and unchecked possession would be allowed.
That controlling the flow of technology is
the predicted action from such a model is not a surprise: the assumptions
allow for few other options to be considered. The point of using the
examples of technology control regimes above, was to show that by
the time the Australia Group adopted this course of action for biological
technologies, the assumptions of the model are third generation: first
CoCom and Wassanaar, second the Australia Group for chemicals, then
the Australia Group for biological technologies. Moreover, CoCom was
established in 1949 at the beginning of the Cold War, yet the Australia
Group adopted the course of action for biological technologies forty-one
years later in 1990 at the end of the Cold War. Despite the changes
in the international technology environment (the progression from
a buyers market to a sellers market), the differences in the international
political environment including international threat assessments (Cold
War to post Cold War political climate, national to sub-national threat)
and the differences in the technologies being controlled (predominately
single use technologies to dual use technologies) the model being
used is almost the same, so the course of action remains the same.
Returning to the journal editors statement:
reactions to self-censorship
Returning to examine the journal editors statement after such
a discussion of context, suggests that the journal editors are not
simply proposing a system of self-censorship, but also identifying
and validating a widely accepted threat model and continuing the belief
that third generation pre-packaged solutions are an appropriate response
to the threat.
A textual analysis of the journal editors statement
shows that the group does indeed seem to have accepted (inherited)
the model of threat and therefore accepted (inherited) those embedded
assumptions described above. Contained in the statement is assumption
1:
Fundamental is a view, shared by nearly all, that
there is information that… presents enough risk of use by terrorists
that it should not be published
…the prospect of bioterrorism has raised legitimate
concerns about the potential abuse of published information
The implicit course of action offered by the
model is also present:
We recognize that on occasion an editor may conclude
that the potential harm of publication outweighs the potential societal
benefits. Under such circumstances, the paper should be modified,
or not be published
By suggesting a path of self-censorship, the
journal editors are 'buying into' the model’s linear assumptions that
increased availability of technology and increased ability of biology
to be put to hostile uses will increase the likelihood of BW use.
By doing so, the journal editors are publicly identifying themselves
with a fight against a social harm and therefore strengthening the
groups identity as working for social good. They are also given a
guide for action: curtail relevant technology, in this case scientific
research, and there will be a decrease in a social harm.
The repetition of the assumptions within the
statement, whether consciously or unconsciously, does suggest acceptance
of them. Should the adoption of the model have taken place without
recognising that these assumptions also require acceptance then there
is sufficient conflict with the model of scientific behaviour to provoke
an identity crisis. For this latter model, to which most scientists
identify with, has an established social behaviour pattern of critical
examination of the validity of new assumptions. This is performed
without insult to the claimant.
Given that the workshop lasted one day, and the time constraints
for formulating a consensus statement, perhaps it was impossible
to thoroughly test the model of threat before accepting it. As such,
it is hoped that this statement is just the beginning of a process
which is now seeing a series of tests being conducted, rather than
a final product. If this is so then examination of the threat model
and its evidence might indeed identify several areas where tests of
validity, without insult to the claimant, could be contemplated.
General areas might include testing the causal
and linear aspects of the assumptions, the inability to measure the
effectiveness of past curtailments of technology in terms of how much
they contributed to a decrease in threat, and the inability to measure
the effectiveness this proposed action will have on reduction of threat.
Further tests might include questioning the model's reliance on Cold
War arms control theories, the notion of there being a 'status quo'
in the international arena, and the usefulness of still adhering to
third generation 'pre-packaged solutions' despite changes to the international
environment and differences in the three technologies (nuclear, chemical
and biological) being controlled.
The adoption of the same model to control the
diffusion of three quite different technologies is perhaps the most
important test that could be conducted. Biological technologies, unlike
nuclear and chemical, are predominantly dual-use and control of them
poses difficult challenges: access needs to be 'governed' rather than
curtailed. The difference is subtle, but important - governance allows
the beneficial aspects to proliferate whilst controlling potential
malign uses.
Viewing governance rather than curtailment as the correct course
of action could lead to specific challenges to the model being considered.
The assumption that dual-use technology will fulfil its potential
and be used for hostile purposes is both linear and deterministic
and is incompatible with the normative structure of the model of scientists
which sees pursuit of science as a social good. Also incompatible
is viewing advancing biology as equating to enhanced BW agent development.
Furthermore, neither threat assumption takes adequate account of the
dual aspect of dual-use technologies because intentionality
of the user is not at the core of the response. Should the journal
editors carry through with this editorial proposal, all scientists,
no matter what their intentions or purpose for interest, will have
certain information contained within research papers foreclosed to
them. Yes this will mean that ‘bad’ scientists won’t be able to apply
the research for hostile ends, but it also means that ‘good’ scientists
won’t be able to use the research for positive purposes. [39]
If this is indeed only
the beginning of a process and the journal editors only adopted this
model of threat because of the time constraints involved in having
to agree and formulate a position for publication, then the one page
statement is a positive start. What the journal editors have done
is to identify and ask a crucial question when considering control
of dual-use technologies: what is an acceptable level of risk?
As this is an important and serious question to ask, it is encouraging
that a precautionary response has been taken by the journal editors
whilst investigations continue as to the validity of the threat model.
However, this statement
is only that, a positive start. The real work should now be underway.
The question the journal editors have identified about levels of risk
is very important, but the action they are proposing is contradictory
to the social identification of scientists. More information is essential
in order for others to accept this reason to behave in a different
way. Questions that need answering in order for this to be accepted
include:
What is the level of acceptable risk?
What criteria do they intend to use to identify research
pieces which rise above this level of acceptability?
Will the criteria be based on the general or the acute characteristics
of the research?
Will ease of transferral from legitimate to illegitimate
intents be considered?
In light of the fact that the journal editors say they need
to increase their capacity in identifying such pieces, who will set
this criteria and identify those pieces whilst they do increase their
capacity?
Will this be a scientific community only criteria-setting
and identification process or a process open to the wider community,
just as the 9th January meeting was open to “government officials
and others”?
If the latter, how do the journal editors intend to remove
the institutional biases from the wider community?
And finally, why now?
These questions remain
unanswered. The journal editors group has not as yet described in
any more detail the criteria or processes by which they intend to
carry out this proposal. Until such time as they do, implications
will be had for the upcoming discussions regarding codes of conduct
for scientists.
A code of conduct by definition
is a guide to behaviour which requires a model to either confirm or
dismiss (in which case a new model is created). During this time of
potential crisis when there are two competing models of science and
a new behaviour guide is being proposed, which model of science will
the code of conduct use as its basis? Will a new model be created
or adopted in order to develop a new code of conduct? If so what are
the new model’s embedded assumptions? The same processes described
above - deconstruction and examination of evidence supporting a model’s
embedded assumptions - also needs to be undertaken to create this
code of conduct. Failure to do so, could create yet another crisis
of identity within the scientific community.
[11] United Nations General Assembly. Economic
and social consequences of the armaments and its extremely harmful
effects on world peace and security, Report of the Secretary General,
A/32/88 12th August 1977, pp 85-125.
