We mourn the passing of David Kelly, a modest and good man, an internationally
recognised British authority on biological weapons, and a valued friend
of the Harvard Sussex Program and the Pugwash Conferences. He died
on 17 July 2003. He was then Senior Adviser to the Directorate of
Counter Proliferation and Arms Control of the UK Ministry of Defence
and to the Counter Proliferation Department of the UK Foreign and
Commonwealth Office.
He had become a member of the country’s Scientific Civil Service
in 1973 upon joining, as a molecular virologist, what is now the National
Environment Research Council Centre for Ecology and Hydrology in Oxford.
There he contributed much to the field of biological control applicable
in agriculture, specifically the use of viruses to attack insect pests.
In July 1984 he was recruited by the Ministry of Defence to work at
what was then the Chemical Defence Establishment at Porton Down as
head of microbiology. He directed the research into improved defensive
measures against biological warfare that, during the 1991 Kuwait war,
enhanced the protection of UK forces against possible Iraqi biological
weapons. He also led the successful decontamination of Gruinard Island,
which had been a proving ground for anthrax weapons during the second
world war. In 1989 he first became involved as a technical expert
in the interpretation of the disturbing data emanating from the Soviet
Union, chiefly via defectors such as Vladimir Pasechnik, whom he interviewed
early on, that pointed to covert Soviet violation of the 1972 Biological
Weapons Convention. In 1990, an initially very private ‘trilateral
process’ had been set in motion by the three co-depositaries
of the Convention – the governments of the UK, the USA and the
USSR — that sought to resolve the situation through on-site inspections
in the three countries. These took place during 1991-94, and it was
as a key participant that Dr Kelly began to acquire his experience
and high reputation as a field inspector of possible biological-weapons
activities. He recalls his work then in one of his very last publications,
a chapter in the 2002 VERTIC Verification Yearbook. When, in
1991, UNSCOM began its work in Iraq, Dr Kelly led the first biological
weapons inspection mission; and he led the last, seven years later,
after 35 intervening inspection visits to the country. This work brought
about his merit promotion, in 1992, from Superintendent of the Defence
Microbiology Division at Porton to Deputy Chief Scientific Officer;
and in 1996 he was transferred from Porton to the Ministry of Defence.
He had, in 1995, become Senior Adviser to UNSCOM on biological weapons,
and when, much later, UNMOVIC replaced UNSCOM he served in the training
of its inspectors. Among the tributes that have been paid to him recently
is that of the head of the UK delegation at the opening of the BWC
‘new process’ in Geneva: few people in recent decades, the
ambassador said, can have done more directly to address and deal with
the scourge of biological weapons. This extraordinary “service
in relation to foreign affairs” had been acknowledged in 1996
when, in the Honours system whereby the British Crown recognises outstanding
public service, David Kelly became CMG, a Companion of the Order of
St Michael and St George.
It was both through Pugwash and through the University of Sussex that
David entered into the work of HSP, always with the concern that we
be guided by a proper understanding of what biological armament could
be, was and was not, and that we did not get things wrong. The activities
and findings of UNSCOM provided a vehicle that did not necessitate
disclosure of classified information, for in Iraq a real-world case
study was on display. It was from his UNSCOM experience that, from
1997 onwards, he entered so constructively into the workshops on chemical/biological
warfare disarmament that HSP organises for Pugwash so as to bring
together scientists from many countries to talk issues through as
professionals regardless of national or political rivalries. And it
was from his experiences as an inspector that he spoke at our seminars
in Sussex, London and Cambridge, Massachusetts. Perhaps above all
else, we benefited from the time and friendship that he was always
ready to give to our research students working on aspects of CBW arms
control or technology governance. Generous and public-spirited people
are rare enough anyway; but David had rare knowledge as well. We are
saddened and diminished by his death.
