MISSILE DEFENCE, NON-PROLIFERATION, AND OTHER ISSUES

by Georges Le Guelte

(Contribution to the Pugwash annual conference in Agra, India, November 2001.)

In the foreseeable future, the US policy will remain the most important factor in international relations and security. Any analysis in those fields must therefore refer to the American position, either to criticise it, which is not my purpose, or to explore if it can be improved, and how to make the best use of it. The whole perception of the external world by the US may be deeply affected by the horrific attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, but pending the definition of new prospects, the only possibility is to consider three elements previously laid out : missile defence, opposition to any international commitment, and the aftermath of the cold war.

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MISSILE DEFENSE PROJECT

 The missile defence project has raised very fierce objections from a number of countries, because it was perceived for what it actually is, a cynical attempt to exploit a fear created artificially or grossly exaggerated, in order to serve industrial, financial and electoral interests inside the US with important consequences for all other countries. It has been opposed also because it has become, for its main supporters, not a question of security, but a matter of religion. However, if one disregards the motivations of its promoters, the project is of major interest.

It is true that all arguments in favour of missile defence were fatally flawed, but none of the reasons against it was any stronger. Although it is not by far as immediate and threatening as it has been pretended, ballistic proliferation is a reality, and when a country, assisted by some big powers, tries to manufacture intercontinental missiles, its purpose is certainly not a possible conflict with its immediate neighbours. At a moment, this trend must be stopped before it becomes an actual hazard.

The main reason in favour of a missile defence is the absence of a real nuclear disarmament since 1990. START is not about disarmament. It was negotiated as an element of the cold war, and its purpose is to get rid of armaments which have become strategically useless. As a result, a  number of intercontinental missiles have been eliminated, but nobody knows exactly the number of warheads available in each country. The destruction capability on both sides, reaches roughly the level of the mid-seventies, and the amount of weapons grade fissile materials stored in the US and Russia, readily convertible into fresh warheads, is impressive, although unknown.

In the past, the risk of a collective suicide has been accepted, because the other alternative was to live under an unacceptable regime. At present, the risk of domination of the world by a totalitarian system has dissipated, and it is unhealthy to maintain for eternity the possibility for half a dozen heads of states to kill millions of people, annihilate regions, and destroy our civilisation in a blink. As all efforts towards nuclear disarmament have proved fruitless, it is perfectly justified to look now for any solution which could, in the longer term, deprive those weapons of their lethal capabilities.

The problem therefore is not to determine if a missile defence is politically desirable, but to know if it can one day operate efficiently, if the cost is affordable, and if it is a priority. Only the Americans can answer the last two questions. But on the first one, others might be of assistance, and informal consultations between scientists, from the US and Russia, but perhaps also from other countries, could clarify three points :

-Is there a chance for a hit-to-kill or any other system to work in real conditions? Against which kind of missiles, and in which circumstances? What obstacles must be overcome? A number of American scientists have carried out very important and valuable research on those matters, but it could perhaps help, if they exchanged unofficially their views with Russian experts who have also devoted some efforts to that question.

-If an anti-missile system is feasible, can it be extended to protect the population in other countries? In which conditions? The most important obstacle here is political, but it could be helpful to explore its technical aspects, in particular between American, European, Russian, Japanese, Indian, Chinese, Pakistani… scientists.

-What could be the participation of other countries in the construction of such a system ? Again, the most important question mark is whether American authorities and private firms are open to a co-operation with countries which could make a significant contribution, or if they are determined to oppose any kind of intellectual and industrial collaboration. But at least, there could be a list of options technically sound, which could serve as a basis in future negotiations.

If such discussions have not yet taken place, a group like Pugwash could perhaps be of assistance to facilitate very informal meetings between specialists from various countries.

SHOULD ALL COUNTRIES REFUSE INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS?

The second major feature of the current American policy is its stern opposition to any international commitment. Since January 2001, at least eight conventions on the verge of being enforced have been turned down by the US Administration, which has never attempted to amend their text. It does not oppose the content of the treaties, but the very principle of international commitments, which could limit its capability to define its own interest at any time, without any external obligation.

This is a very dangerous attitude, which provides the regimes of countries such as Iraq, Libya, North Korea, or others, with an unexpected excuse to refuse also for themselves any international obligation. It is in contradiction with the efforts made for centuries to develop a civilisation based on the definition of largely accepted regulations and on a state of law. In the longer term, it may undermine the system of international agreements which took so many efforts to set up.

That position is by far the most regrettable attitude adopted by the current US Administration, but only the American citizens, public opinion, or voters, can change it, intervention from outside the US might even be counterproductive.

Beyond initial reactions, the fight against terrorism cannot be conducted by a country in isolation. A global and lasting effort requires a vast coalition of States, built on a common respect of law. It must be based on the strict implementation by all countries of a coherent set of agreements on all types of trafficking which provide criminal organisations with their resources : money laundering, exports of weapons, drug and cigarettes, international prostitution... Success will depend on a close co-operation between all institutions in charge of law enforcement : police, intelligence services, judicial authorities. It must rest on the definition of a common set of rules on which civilisation is based, and on the confidence that each country will abide by its own obligations.

One can only hope that the attitude of the American administration  regarding international agreements can be reversed as soon as possible. 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR

The most attractive aspect of the announced US policy is the recognition that the cold war is over, that Russia is no longer an enemy of the United States, and that the whole system of international security is obsolete. It does not specify however what should replace it. So far, that statement has remained unfulfilled, because it met in all countries, with a determined resistance from the military and from vested interests. For those who consider the prospect as promising, it is an additional reason to press the point. The field is therefore open for all others to try and explore what they would wish the world to look like in the future.

After the first world war, and chiefly after the second world war, a very valuable effort was made to prevent the repetition of similar conflicts, and define a set of principles, universally accepted, which would form the basis of a new international system. Nothing of that kind has happened after the cold war. The US advocated for a “new international order”, but they did not specify what those words actually meant. The world was therefore left with only the San Francisco Charter of 1945, based on three principles :

-Non-intervention in the internal affairs of an other state, a principle which has never been observed by any country at any moment. During the cold war, it was changed into non-intervention in internal affairs of each bloc, a principle which was scrupulously respected, but is not very helpful when the blocs have disappeared.

-The inalienable right for peoples to decide on their own future, which is very elusive since the definition of a people, on which there is no general agreement, is the very reason of many conflicts.

-Possible military intervention of the international community, under the aegis of the Security Council, to prevent or oppose à breach of peace and security. But there is no agreement on the meaning of peace and security.

The major principles of civilisation are contained in the Preamble of the Charter, they are not legally binding, and they are carefully ignored by most signatories, who are strongly decided not to implement them.

At present, it would still be impossible to reach a general agreement on basic questions such as democracy, human rights, or even terrorism. But it might at least be worth the effort to explore, in very informal meetings, the possibility to agree on matters linked to international security.

WHAT AFTER THE 1972 ABM TREATY?

In the meantime, the US administration is willing to dismantle the system of international agreements of the past, starting with the 1972 ABM Treaty. They are right to claim that the treaty was the cornerstone of international stability, but of the cold war stability, and it is outdated. At present, very few people actually believe that a pre-emptive strike can be avoided only through a strict parity between the US and Russian arsenals, and by the vulnerability of the territory and population of each country, as was the case until 1990. ABM was a very useful instrument of the cold war, it is no longer a necessity. Cancellation of the treaty can be justified, but it would be necessary to explore, at the same time, what should be the bases of international strategic stability in 2001. A system based on assured common security is by far better than the mutually assured destruction of the past. But it would be important to define the practical implications of that new concept. What does it mean in terms of policy, of strategy, of armaments?  

It seems that recently, the debates between the US and the Russian Federation on the possible cancellation of the treaty had become less acrimonious. The common fight against terrorism may also facilitate a dialogue on future co-operation, and the US may realise that they do not need to get rid of ABM as urgently as they felt or stated. Perhaps could it be possible to take advantage of that situation to try and discuss what collective security could mean in the future. The whole issue is primarily a political matter, but discussions between scientists of different origins and nationalities could provide a common understanding of the possible consequences of mutually assured security on existing armaments and defence systems.

TOWARDS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

The most compelling item on international security is nuclear disarmament. The illusions of the eighties and nineties have been dispelled. The world has realised that public opinion can hardly be mobilised in support of any objective over a long period. We now know that if it was decided to dismantle all existing warheads, and to render the fissile materials less easily usable for explosive purposes, it would be impossible to reach the goal in less than half a century, and probably much more.

Building on the report of the Canberra Commission, it would therefore be reasonable to define the main features of a programme of nuclear disarmament which should be implemented step by step. The programme should include, at each step, the destruction of a certain number of missiles, the dismantlement of a given number of nuclear warheads, the treatment of a specified amount of fissile materials, which would be rendered unsuitable for the production of nuclear explosive devices. But the programme should also provide, at each step, for specific progress in detection of undeclared activities, for strengthening safeguards on declared materials, for improvements in accountancy, control and physical protection in facilities containing nuclear materials, for stringent export controls on sensitive and dual use equipment, materials and technologies. It should also promote a strong international co-operation to fight illegal trafficking.

The programme should acknowledge that, until a final joint decision is made to eliminate all nuclear weapons, the current arsenals should not be deprived of their only beneficial character as deterrents to avoid an all-out war. It should therefore acknowledge that before embarking into the next step, countries which avail themselves of nuclear weapons would be given an opportunity to verify that the progress expected in all sectors of the programme has materialised, and that the evolution of the international situation is not such that they should suspend the disarmament process. It should also be recognised that none of the nuclear weapons countries will accept the total elimination of its own arsenal as long as the risk of clandestine activities did not fade away.

The chances for such a programme to be adopted by any country in the near future is null, but if it was worked out by recognised personalities, as it was the case for the Canberra Commission, under the aegis of organisations such as Pugwash, it could have a significant didactic impact, and would demonstrate that a long term programme of complete nuclear disarmament would be technically feasible, and reasonable from a strategic point of view.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

One of the most prominent topics could be nuclear non-proliferation. In order to promote their project, the American supporters of the missile defence have stated, and even written, that the non-proliferation policy conducted since the mid-sixties has failed, which is in contradiction with the facts. They argued that Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and others, could acquire nuclear weapons very rapidly, a mere allegation which is not based on factual evidence. They argued that the non-proliferation policy was linked to the cold war, and should be cancelled once the war was over, a statement that is also fatally flawed. Although none of those allegations is consistent with actual facts, the damage caused to the non-proliferation policy is real.

In addition, the system has been undermined by the unfortunate insistence on the importance to ratify the CTBT and to reach an agreement on a cut-off convention. Public opinion is at present convinced that the non-proliferation system is incomplete, and that it will not work until those two agreements are implemented.

Which is also wrong. The CTBT and the cut-off convention have their own merits, but they have no bearing, whatsoever, on non-proliferation, since they do not add anything, from that standpoint, to the NPT. In addition, at present, all countries in the world, except the 8 States which possess nuclear weapons, have adhered to the NPT, or, in the case of Cuba, to a similar agreement. The present non-proliferation regime contains all necessary legal obligations. It does not need to be complemented by any other treaty or agreement, it does not need to be amended, it must only be implemented rigorously.

The non-proliferation regime may also be undermined by those who claim that the construction of new power reactors would increase the risk of proliferation. In fact, since 1945, no facility under international safeguards has been used to manufacture a nuclear explosive device, and a number of countries (Germany, Japan, Switzerland, Sweden, Belgium, Canada, South Africa, the Republic of Korea, to name a few of them) operate many large power reactors, some of them detain important quantities of separated plutonium on their soil. They all have rejected the prospect of a military program. On the other hand, several countries which have no reactor in operation have tried to produce nuclear weapons by enriching uranium. South Africa, Pakistan, did not use the plutonium from their power reactors but enriched uranium for their military program, and Iraq  was trying to do the same. Israël, India used dedicated facilities, not power reactors to produce their plutonium. Proliferation is a political decision, not a technical opportunity. A country does not produce weapons simply because it has some plutonium available. Things happen the other way round, a country decides first to try and acquire nuclear weapons. Then, it uses the material which, in the particular circumstances of the moment, can be most easily accessible, which is frequently enriched uranium, rather than plutonium.

To strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation policy, it would be necessary for all major countries to reaffirm solemnly and strongly their attachment to the current system, and to explain that there will be no adverse consequence on the regime if the CTBT and the cut-off convention remain in limbo.

To improve the efficiency of the non-proliferation policy, emphasis should be placed on three items :

-A strict application of IAEA safeguards on declared materials. The frequency of inspections can conceivably be reduced in some types of facilities and some categories of materials, but it should be stressed that, if diversion of fissile materials from a safeguarded utility becomes easier, a would-be proliferator might be tempted to use a declared facility.

-A much more important research programme on techniques to detect undeclared activities.

-A much larger effort by the whole international community to dispose of the military nuclear materials in the US and in Russia, especially plutonium in Russia. Ten years after the end of the cold war, the amount of materials in storage is impressive. Only a fraction of the Russian enriched uranium has been diluted. As for plutonium, only grams, out of hundreds of tonnes, have been rendered harmless. This is certainly an important temptation of theft or corruption for would-be proliferators, even if, so far, there has been no significant diversion of weapons grade material. The risk may be limited in the United States, where measures of security are generally supposed to be tight, but according to Russian experts themselves, precautions seem to be less stringent in Russia. The major risk of proliferation lies in those loose materials. It comes therefore as a surprise that many of those advocating passionately against the construction of new nuclear reactors seem to ignore the risk resulting from the insufficient security in facilities containing military materials, which is by far more dangerous.

-Close co-operation between the IAEA and national intelligence services. Even with the 1997 protocol completely in force, the Agency can at best detect undeclared activities, but it has no legal or technical possibility to identify the location of a clandestine facility, unless the inspectors are very lucky. This remains the responsibility of national services.

BALLISTIC NON-PROLIFERATION

One of the most crucial issues of the present time is probably ballistic non-proliferation. The only legal instrument in force is the MTCR, whose shortcomings are very well known. In 2000, the Russian President proposed to improve the existing system. Although he did not make any specific suggestion to that effect, it was a major step forward, coming from a country which, in the past, was not known to place ballistic non-proliferation among its priorities. His proposal has led only to a limited system of information between the US and Russia on the launching of their missiles.

It has been suggested to set up a code of conduct between the members of the MTCR, but that would not limit the activities of non-member States. A suggestion has been made to draft a kind of ballistic NPT, based on an extension of the 1987 INF treaty to all countries. It has also been mentioned that a system of international verification could be added to verify the implementation of legal commitments.

Informal discussions between scientists from various countries could perhaps explore the technical requirements and the main obstacles for an efficient ballistic non-proliferation regime, and try to work out sound solutions to reduce a risk which may, in the longer term, threaten international security.

In the near future, the struggle against international terrorism will, quite understandably, take precedence over any other consideration. The present period may therefore be appropriate to assess the technical, and possibly political, advantages and disadvantages of various systems, which could be available to decision makers when the time comes to set up a new regime of international security, better suited to the situation in the world after the cold war.

                                                                        Georges Le Guelte

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