The
events of the last month have revealed how fragile conditions are
in Iraq. The U.S., after a year of occupation, has failed to win the
trust of the Iraqi people and has allowed the country to slip into
turmoil. This is not the "civil war" that many feared would break
out between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. Rather, it is a confrontation
provoked by the coalition authority itself by failing to allow the
Iraqi people to participate in the political process to elect an assembly
that can truly represent them.
For
over a year, Iraqis have lived with discontent, frustration and anger
with the occupation. But people were told by their religious and community
leaders to stay patient, and wait for the promised elections. During
the first year of occupation, Iraqis showed enormous discipline marching
in protest. They should have been encouraged to keep that discipline
in marching toward ballot boxes.
The
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) made a cardinal mistake by failing
to establish a provisional government from the outset with the sole
task of preparing for elections. Instead it appointed a Transitional
Governing Council (TGC) that overstepped its legitimacy by promulgating
laws that should have been left to an elected body.
The
current crisis is rooted in the interim constitution that emanated
from negotiations that took place between the CPA and the TGC in almost
complete secrecy, and without any public debate. The document is in
fact a full-fledged constitution that commits Iraq to many important
decisions that should have been left to the debate on the permanent
constitution in a legitimately elected assembly. In doing so, the
CPA went beyond its mandate as an occupying authority under international
humanitarian law.
In
the interim constitution, the CPA and TGC entitled themselves to enforce
laws or sign agreements that would be binding to any future elected
government. It also states that the permanent constitution, due by
October 2005, will not be adopted if rejected by a two-thirds majority
of any three provinces out of 18; and the elected national assembly
will be dissolved and new elections must be held. This veto provision
could potentially throw the political process into a paralyzing and
self-defeating cycle of elections and redrafting.
Instead
of imposing such a de facto constitution, it would have been wiser
to have developed consensus across the Iraqi political spectrum to
agree on a general set of principles, consistent with international
law, to guide the transition. Constitutions are important documents
in the lives of nations that organize their political structures and
system of governance.
In
Iraq, the issues of Kurdish autonomy, minority rights and majority
rule require all the constituencies to work out a practical arrangement
for co-existence. In this process, Iraqis require the help of the
U.N., which alone has the legitimacy for handling a political situation
as complex and difficult as Iraq. The U.S. must work vigorously with
the U.N. in the coming days to forge a consensus on a political transition
that can be supported by the great majority of Iraqis. This will almost
certainly require alleviating objections to the interim constitution.
If
Iraqis are to reject the path of armed uprising proposed by the Fallujah
fighters and Muqtada al-Sadr, they must have the prospect of realizing
their legitimate political aims through the democratic process. This
means reaching out to all respected community leaders, political stakeholders
and Iraqis who have real influence in the country to establish an
administration that can assume power from the CPA on July 1, 2004.
The provisional government should comprise Iraqis known for their
honesty, integrity and competence. This must be immediately followed
by rigorous and visible preparations for the election of a national
assembly.
The
U.N. envoy to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi, rightly pointed out in his press
conference on April 14 that "There is no substitute for the legitimacy
that comes from free and fair elections. Therefore, Iraq will have
a genuinely representative government only after [such elections]."
He also explained that "[T]here is a general legal principle, and
that is that the elected body, especially if it is entrusted with
drafting the constitution, should not have its hands tied by anything,
but should be independent. It should be able to draft the constitution
with unfettered freedom."
The
new provisional government should only be a caretaker government to
prepare for elections. It should not indulge in negotiating military,
economic or political treaties or agreements that will bind legitimately
elected governments in the future. To do so will convince even those
Iraqis who still have faith in the American good will that the U.S.
troops are there not to help Iraqis to build a free and just society
and develop a democratic political system, but to extort from them
military concessions and exploit their oil reserves.
At
stake today is not just Iraq's political future, but America's credibility
throughout the Middle East. Having pledged to bring democracy to Iraq,
the Bush administration needs to respect the desire of the majority
of Iraqis to elect a representative and accountable government that
serves its people and observes human rights.
For
over three decades, Iraqis have offered enormous sacrifices in order
to be free, and to live under just governance. Without a clear and
transparent constitutional process, Iraqis will not be assured that
their basic human and political rights would be respected. They have
a deep fear that another dictatorial regime will emerge in their country.
Failing to engage the people in a political process will further destabilize
the country and provide fertile grounds for remnants of Saddam Hussein's
intelligence apparatus to recruit zealots -- Iraqis or from neighboring
countries -- to carry out terrorist acts, as we have recently witnessed
in several Iraqi cities.
There
is a good reason why the U.S. administration should concede to the
wish of the Iraqi people to hold elections under U.N. auspices, and
allow them to draft and own their constitution. This would send a
powerful message to all Iraqis and to all people of the region that
it is possible to have a nonviolent argument with the U.S. and succeed.
And it would be a strong rebuff to those who claim that the only way
to ascertain rights is through violence and terrorism.
Mr.
Al-Shahristani, a senior adviser to Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, is chairman
of the standing committee of the Iraqi National Academy of Science.
He was held in solitary confinement for 10 years under Saddam Hussein.
